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110 
GAMBLING WITH THE HEALTH OF OTHERS 
Stephen P. Teret* & Jon S. Vernick**
 † 
The health and wellbeing of the public is, in part, a function of the be-
havior of individuals. When one individual’s behavior places another at a 
foreseeable and easily preventable risk of illness or injury, tort liability can 
play a valuable role in discouraging that conduct. This is true in the context 
of childhood immunization. 
I. The Government Regulates Private 
Conduct to Promote Health  
In public health, what one person does has the potential to affect others. 
The effect may be disease related, such as when a person with a cold goes to 
work and passes the cold on to coworkers. The effect can also be economic, 
as when a motorcyclist rides helmetless, he suffers a head injury that could 
have been averted by the use of a helmet, and we then all share the expense 
of his care and rehabilitation. 
Sometimes, when an individual makes a decision, he or she may think 
only of the personal consequences of that decision. The motorcyclist who 
wants to feel the wind in his hair may ignore the risk of riding without a 
helmet, or may calculate and then assume the risk, incorrectly thinking he is 
the only one involved in the possible consequences. In order to reduce the 
likelihood of such conduct and to control the economic costs of head inju-
ries to motorcyclists, all states have passed mandatory helmet laws, though 
some states have repealed them. These laws, passed over the vocal objection 
of some motorcyclists, have proven to be both constitutional and effective in 
reducing severe head injuries and deaths. 
In the field of childhood infectious diseases, the state has several inter-
ests to protect: the health of the child (under the parens patriae role of the 
state), the health of others who may come in direct or indirect contact with 
the child, and the economic interests of society, which will inevitably cover 
some or all of the costs incurred by childhood illnesses. To address infec-
tious diseases such as diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, mumps, measles, and 
others that historically have been devastating to children and others, each 
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state has, through an exercise of the police power reserved to the states, 
passed mandatory immunization laws requiring parents to demonstrate that 
their children have been vaccinated in order to attend school. These laws are 
generally recognized as among the most successful interventions in the field 
of public health, having enormously reduced the incidence of morbidity and 
mortality that previously plagued childhood populations. 
II. Risks Resulting from Philosophical Exemptions 
to Vaccination Requirements  
All states have included in their mandatory immunization laws a provi-
sion that if a vaccination is medically contra-indicated for an individual 
child, that child need not be vaccinated. The vast majority of states have also 
included a religious exemption within the law, so that children for whom 
vaccination would be a violation of a religious tenet can still attend schools 
without being vaccinated. But some parents of children for whom immuni-
zation is neither medically contra-indicated nor proscribed by their religion 
do not want to have their children vaccinated due to other, strongly held, 
personal reasons. These reasons include beliefs about medical responses to 
vaccines that are not substantiated by epidemiologic research, or beliefs 
based on personal moral grounds that might not fully meet the requirements 
of the religious exemption. The political response to the antivaccinationists 
has been to create a personal or philosophical exemption to mandatory im-
munization laws. Research, such as a 2006 study in JAMA by Dr. Omer and 
his colleagues has shown that states with such philosophical exemptions 
have geographic pockets of nonimmunized children attending schools—and 
such clusters have been related to infectious disease outbreaks involving 
previously controlled diseases. 
Not only are these nonimmunized children exposed to the risk of acquir-
ing these sometimes serious diseases, but so are children who have not been 
immunized for medical contra-indications and religious beliefs. Also, a 
modest percentage of children who do get vaccinated against an infectious 
disease are also at risk, because vaccinations are not 100% effective. Thus, 
the decision of a parent not to vaccinate his or her child poses serious risk to 
the public. 
III. Tort Liability as a Deterrent 
Tort liability could encourage vaccination of children among parents 
who might otherwise take advantage of the easy availability of a philosophi-
cal exemption. Tort liability not only serves the purpose of compensating a 
damaged plaintiff, but it also serves as an incentive for preventing injury and 
disease. This was recognized long ago by William Prosser who wrote in his 
seminal treatise that with tort litigation, “there is of course a strong incentive 
to prevent the occurrence of the harm. Not infrequently one reason for im-
posing liability is the deliberate purpose of providing that incentive.” 
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The availability of tort liability influences the behavior of potential de-
fendants. Product manufacturers have often changed the design of their 
products to reduce risks, in an effort to minimize their exposure to liability. 
In fact, one study conducted by RAND in the early 1980s concluded that for 
lightly regulated manufacturers, liability was the single greatest factor influ-
encing product design decisions. Similarly, professionals such as physicians 
engage in defensive practices based on the threat of liability. But the extent 
to which individuals acting in their personal capacity, such as parents mak-
ing decisions about the health care of their children, adjust their behaviors 
for the purpose of avoiding liability is less well known. 
Although a parent’s exposure to tort liability for failure to have a child 
immunized might improve vaccination (and infection) rates, there are obsta-
cles to imposing liability under existing principles of negligence. To succeed 
in an action for negligence, the plaintiff must generally establish by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that (1) the defendant owed him or her a legally 
recognized duty; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) the plaintiff has 
legally cognizable injuries; and (4) the defendant’s breach was the “but for,” 
and also proximate, cause of those injuries. At least three of these four tradi-
tional elements of negligence might be problematic for the plaintiff in an 
action alleging injuries associated with a defendant parent’s failure to vacci-
nate his or her child. Where the defendant has relied on a legislatively 
established philosophical exemption from vaccination, it would be difficult 
to argue that he or she owes the plaintiff a “duty” to be vaccinated that has 
been breached. In addition, establishing that an illness suffered by plaintiff’s 
child was caused by the defendant’s failure to vaccinate his or her child 
could be challenging. 
However, these obstacles are certainly not insurmountable. For example, 
a state could amend its law to specifically allow for liability as a condition 
of claiming the philosophical exemption. The state could even require per-
sons invoking the exemption to acknowledge, in writing, that their actions 
might place others at risk—with resulting potential for liability. And if the 
defendant’s unvaccinated child were the plaintiff’s only known exposure to 
the illness (for example, in a classroom), the finder of fact could easily 
enough conclude that causation has been established by a preponderance of 
the evidence. Even if the plaintiff had been exposed to several others with 
the disease, genetic sequencing of the pathogen might still allow a finder of 
fact to determine whether the defendant is the most likely source. 
As public health professionals, our primary goal is to reduce morbidity 
and mortality associated with childhood illnesses. Some may argue that tort 
law is a blunt instrument for accomplishing that objective. As with any in-
tervention, the availability of tort litigation carries some risk of unintended 
consequences—such as increasing political opposition to mandatory vacci-
nation associated with school attendance. Others may be concerned about 
potential risks to the reputation or integrity of the judicial system itself. In 
our view, however, the potential benefits of increasing vaccination rates 
outweigh these concerns. The judicial system is not likely to see a substan-
tial increase in litigation, nor will it be unable to navigate a new tort far less 
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complex than many it currently handles. We also note that our argument in 
favor of tort liability is limited to the case of a parent invoking a philosophi-
cal exemption that, unlike a religious exemption, does not directly implicate 
First Amendment protections. 
We certainly do not argue that tort liability is the only, or even the most 
important, way to improve vaccination rates. However, it seems appropriate 
for society to discourage one parent from engaging in a behavior that places 
another parent’s child at a foreseeable—and preventable—risk. Tort liability 
can do just that. 
